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kinship ties. Declining standards of governance facilitate state-sponsored corruption and
criminality in a setting where the shadow economic activity is increasingly important to
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source of income.
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The basic outline of the situation in the Caucasus, a relatively resource rich region of
great ethnic and confessional diversity, an uneasy history of conflict, migration, shifting
political boundaries and great power overlords, is well-known. For the past decade, the
region has been torn by multiple territorial conflicts, which have produced between 2
and 3 million refugees and displaced persons, representing approximately 10 per cent of
the population of the region. At present one active war is in progress in Chechnya, more
or less stable cease-fires are being observed in Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan and
South Ossetia, while a third of Abkhazia is in shambles and multiple international
observer missions are in place in troubled zones throughout the region.
The problems of creating transparency in the formal institutions of the state and
accountability of government officials; establishing genuine elections, an independent
judiciary and impartial law enforcement; the protection of individual and property
rights; control over corruption in economic and political life; and the rapidly expanding
role of informal and criminal economic activity, are seen in virtually all transitional and
many developing countries. While the former Soviet Union (FSU) as a whole has
experienced difficulty in reestablishing a set of institutional norms that are upheld by
both sides of the social compact—the state and the population—these problems have
been particularly acute in the Caucasus.
As in the Balkans, competing claims either latent or soluble within a larger system
integrating ethnic groups, redistributing resources and adjudicating between interest
groups, became causes of conflict when the overarching political structure dissolved. In
its absence, republics were established to valorize particular ethnic-national identities,
but due to their complex geographical terrain and rarely if ever populated by a single or
dominant majority group, have found themselves unable to maintain the territorial
integrity of their inherited political administrative boundaries.
1 The captured state: kleptocracy and criminalization
The legitimacy of formal political institutions declined sharply in the late Soviet period
as they became increasingly visibly colonized by opportunist elements of the elite.
Taking advantage of perestroika liberalization, some segments of the elite shifted their
emphasis from the perquisites attached to positions of political power to private
personal enrichment via political position or political connections. While the proximate
cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union was a struggle for power between two political
figures, the state had already been weakened by widespread institutional atrophy. Boris
Yeltsin prevailed over Mikhail Gorbachev because the former was willing to dissolve an
empire in exchange for political control over its wealthy core. Throughout his
presidency of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin continued to trade economic and
territorial resources for political control over an increasingly weakened state.
Encouraged by the Yeltsin administration’s firesale approach to economic stewardship,
the state institutions that controlled financial flows were ‘privatized’ by certain sub-
elites who redirected the ownership or use of national wealth to their members, their
patrons and their clients groups (Wedel 2001). The scale of the theft of public resources
and the active participation of the Yeltsin administration in undermining the state itself
were unprecedented (Reddaway and Glinski 2001).2
These events led to the disintegration of economic cooperation within the region and the
collapse of the formal economy in most of its successor states.1 Although Russia and
other energy producers have reoriented a significant share of their trade to the West, the
majority of the former Soviet countries have been less successful in penetrating new
external markets. The tables in Appendix III provide some indicators of the extent of the
decline. Buffered by oil and gas revenues, real GDP is slightly over half of its 1989
level in Russia and Azerbaijan, but well below half in Georgia and Armenia, while real
wages in all are less than half of their pre-transition level (Appendix Table 2). Real
output hovers around half of its 1989 level throughout the region, with industrial gross
output suffering the most extreme decline (Appendix Tables 3c and 3d). There has been
a parallel collapse in government expenditures, and even more radical reductions in
state expenditures on education and health care as a percentage of a much reduced GDP
(Appendix Table 6). Not surprisingly, this massive disinvestment in social welfare is
evident in declining life expectancy and rising maternal, infant and under-five mortality
rates (Appendix Table 7).
The countries of the FSU are characterized by the social contract having been cancelled
from above by segments of the elite who are no longer committed to serving the
interests of the society at large nor are held in check by the authority of the state. These
groups saw an opportunity for immense personal gain in the destruction of the old
system of largely egalitarian redistribution and its transformation from a system in
which power is concentrated in the hands of a very few to a system of concentration of
wealth. Their success in taking control of the sources of national wealth without
provoking popular rebellion was in part facilitated by other segments of the elite, which
remained committed either to society as a whole or to a personal moral code. As public
resource flows drained into private hands, these groups and individuals continued to
provide services in the social sector, military, police, etc. despite a decline in funding to
well below the levels necessary to maintain them. Public protest was relatively
widespread but lacking both experience and effective mechanisms for exerting influence
on the political processes or control over the activities of the state administration, it was
rarely effective in producing real change. The rapidly deteriorating economic situation
was also a strong force re-directing individual energies into pragmatic survival
activities.
2 Social devolution
Corruption is a way of life. People don’t believe that the state will ever provide services
or enforce the law, so they don’t pay taxes.2 This broad-scale failure to serve the public
interest—together with rampant corruption and increasing poverty—has delegitimized
the central political institutions of the state. ‘The population has responded to the
cancellation of the social contract from above by withdrawing their participation from
below—levels of voter participation, tax payment and expressed confidence in political
                                                
1 From the equivalent of US$139 billion in 1991, trade among the CIS countries had fallen to US$59
billion in 2000 (Moscow Times, 27 August 2001: 8).
2 David Usupashvili, Chairman Georgian Anti-Corruption Commission, cited in Lieven (2001a: 2).3
institutions have plummeted.3 At the same time, virtually all of the informal and most of
the formal social institutions of the former system have retained their legitimacy.
Educational, health care and social welfare institutions, despite declining levels of
service, continue to enjoy broad public support and sympathy of those who work in
them as reflected in both survey data and voluntary behaviour.4 The general population
has largely retained its commitment to the egalitarian and meritocratic values of the
prior system and expresses strong disapproval of the current ruling elite’s violation of
them. While some increase in insecurity and inequality is accepted as a trade-off for
freedom of expression and movement, the absence of a reliable formal institutional
environment (i.e. the rule of law) is not. Despite having been negated by segments of
the elite, widely held social norms which could serve as a strong foundation for
democratization continue to be upheld by the majority of society. This omission is
perhaps the single most serious failure of transition-from-above.5
The mutual rejection initiated by a self-interested political and economic elite rapidly
produced a ‘vicious’ cycle of economic crises, declining public revenues, declining
public investments, declining public services, and declining willingness on the part of
the population to participate in or finance state activities (Azam and Mesnard 2001).
3 Ethnic identity or clans and networks?
Before looking for solutions, we must understand the underlying causes of conflict.
Although ‘grievances’ are plentiful in the region and ‘greed’ hardly less prevalent
(Collier and Hoeffler 1999, 2001) in the current round of the Caucasian Chalk Circle,
the latter preceded the former and neither initiated the process, which was set in motion
by the forces described above.6
In response to state failure to provide public goods or social services, the population has
fallen back on informal institutions—the pre-existing family and friendship networks on
which ethnic and confessional identities are based—as the most reliable forms of risk-
sharing, rules and sanctions for the organization of social and economic life available
                                                
3 In gubernatorial elections (August 2001) in the Nizhny Novgorod and Irkutsk regions only about one-
third of eligible voters participated (Moscow Times, 31 August 2001: 7).
4 A significant proportion of economic activity has shifted into the ‘informal’ or ‘shadow’ economy,
reducing taxable formal incomes. Although demands for informal side payments abound, a less well-
reported phenomenon has been observed in cases of voluntary self-taxation, which also belies the
‘free-rider’ problem. For example, the parents of a class of school children commit to paying a regular
joint supplement to a teacher’s salary, which is less than the subsistence minimum. This type of
payment cannot be classified as a bribe, user fee, or privatization of service provision, but is made
explicitly to compensate for state failure to adequately fund public services.
5 Among the inherited administrative structures of Russia and the Transcaucasus are Accounting
Chambers (chotnaya palata), which conduct in-depth investigations into public expenditures
(equivalent to the US General Accounting Office). These institutions have remained rigorously honest
and provide clear accounting of government misappropriations, unauthorized expenditures, etc. (see
UNDP’s NHDR (1999) for Armenia, for example). Apparently, in the absence of any fear of sanctions
from the judiciary, there has been no reason to bribe or threaten the accountants.
6 The Bertolt Brecht play is framed by a fable about a conflict over rights of control and the
responsibilities of public stewardship.4
(Azam 2001). The multiple overlays of these patterns of identification and security and
their failure to coincide with any formal political or geographical boundaries in the
Caucasus, together with the fragmentation of its elites into frequently warring clans,
have played a significant, and perhaps decisive role in multiple conflicts.
Attempts to make sense of these conflicts in terms of ethnic nationalism as the principal
form of political organization, as well as efforts to anchor the legitimacy of formal
institutions by promoting good governance practices on the part of the current state
administrations are unlikely to be successful. First, ethnic-confessional nationalism is
not currently the dominant form of social political identification in the region, but
narrower sub-ethnic relational identity groups, which may unite for a common purpose
or may compete for resources in a set of complex interactions.7 Second, good
governance is directly contrary to the immediate interests of the vast majority of the
current ruling elites. Thus, plausible solutions appear to lie either outside the regions or
in the interests of non-elite segments of the population. Only pressure from one or both
of these directions could possibly either shift the medium-term interests of the ruling
elites or find non-rent-seeking replacements for them.
4 Regional sovereignty as an accidental state8
The nation states of the Trans-Caucasus and the Republics of the North Caucasus are
not the products of internal opposition nor are the ethnic-national identities and
territorial boundaries on which they are based. They were inherited from the Soviet
Union, as were their leaders, with the exception of Armenian President Robert
Kocharjan. Prior to becoming president (for life) of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev was
director of the Azerbaijan KGB, then First Party Secretary of Azerbaijan and finally a
member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and First Deputy Prime Minister of the
USSR, returning to Azerbaijan as leader of Nakhichevan.9 Eduard Shevardnadze,
followed a similar career path in the security apparatus, rising to the post of Minister of
Foreign Affairs under Mikhail Gorbachev. Dzhokhar Dudayev, the charismatic leader of
the first Chechen war (which, in contrast to the current bandit warfare did constitute a
                                                
7 Religious confession persisted in the region, with some exceptions, as a largely cultural identity. Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian State has returned property and other resources to the
Orthodox Church (including tax-free alcohol and tobacco sales) and supported its efforts to reestablish
itself as a social institution. Other religious organizations have moved significant amounts of funding
and missionaries into the region. Shamil Basayev, one of the better known Chechen ‘Wahhabite’
warrior leaders, now believed to be one of the organizers of the Moscow Theater hostage siege
(Shermatova 2002), cast considerable doubt on the depth of his Islamic fundamentalism in earlier
media interviews in which he noted that his wife had never worn a head scarf, nor had he been an
active believer.
8 In a number of these ‘titular’ republics the official ethnic group was in the minority and although their
proportions grew, especially between 1979-89 as Russians and Armenians in particular moved away,
in several they remain the distinct minority, for example in Abkhazia and Adigeya.
9 Aliyev’s constituency in Nakhichevan and Kocharyan’s origins in Nagorno-Karabakh are another
factor in the warring parties’ intractability (see Appendix I: Caucasus conflicts). While the two leaders
have on several occasions been willing to conclude an agreement over the disputed territories, neither
has been ready to defy their core constituents’ ultimate refusal to accept a compromise.5
popular nationalist war of secession), was a Soviet Air Force colonel. Ruslan Aushev,
former President of Ingushetia was a Russian Army general.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, these apparatchiks and military leaders returned to
their home power bases and began establishing control over territorial resources. Ethnic-
national and confessional identities were mobilized ex post facto to substitute for the
previous ideology. The returnees, however, found entrenched provincial elites, who
were equally willing to mobilize ethnic-nationalist or older, deeper, and more
particularist identities in the competition for control over shrinking resources. Rather
than society being united in opposition or transformed in the struggle for national
sovereignty, the Soviet legacy of both economic structures and political personnel
induced a repetition of re-division of control by the elite over political power and
resource flows. Without either an external or internal guardian of the rule of law,
however, the logic of Soviet territorial units became in many cases unsustainable. The
ensuing ‘hostile divorces’ frequently involved armed conflict and with it, the destruction
of transit and trade links throughout the region. Within territorial boundaries, stable or
otherwise, captured formal institutions were replaced by informal family and clan ties
(with territorial sub-units often controlled by ethnic-confessional clan networks or
coalitions), the only instrument available to ensure socially enforceable commitments,
safety and the sharing of resources. Where formal inter- and intra-regional trade and
transit have ceased, informal or criminal cooperation has often taken over.
While all of the territorial administrations of the Caucasus have accommodated ethnic-
clan interests, their success has varied. Daghestan, with a very large number of different
ethnic groups, has preserved a system for the division of resources among them. Thus
far, despite an armed Chechen incursion into several Daghestani villages and their
subsequent destruction by Russian troops, which marked the beginning of the second
Chechen war, inter-ethnic cooperation has been maintained. In contrast, in the Armenia-
Azerbaijan conflict or the first Chechen war against Russia, ethnic-confessional
identities were effectively mobilized as a unifying factor against an identifiable enemy
‘other’, but ethnic-nationalist coalitions quickly disintegrated into clan-based interest
groups in the post-conflict phase. Still, Armenia and Azerbaijan have survived as states,
despite armed conflict, large refugee flows and de facto border changes. The violent
secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, followed by the de facto withdrawal of
Adjaria and the assertion of clan control of other areas of the country suggest that
Georgia has effectively failed as a unified state (Lieven 2001a; Cohen 2001).
5 The role of the shadow economy in the Caucasus
In the absence of an internally coherent state administration and mechanisms for some
form of public oversight and control, the boundary between the informal and the
criminal has become extremely vague. Economic activity, especially with a longer-term
investment horizon such as manufacturing or natural resource extraction, cannot exist in
an institutional vacuum. As formal institutions falter and formal employment declines,
previously existing informal institutions and informal economic activities, particularly
short-term trading operations, evolve and expand to fill the gap. Where the state does
not establish and reliably enforce the rules of the game, informal institutions eventually
take over, and corruption and crime flourish. For example, the lack of reliable legal
protection of property and contract enforcement forces entrepreneurs to take practical
steps to conduct business within this environment, reinforcing a vicious cycle. ‘There
are only two ways to survive here. To become financially strong yourself, or to place6
yourself under the protection of someone who is stronger. But there is no way to be a
citizen, there is only a kind of feudalism, in politics, government, and business’.10
A first obvious response to non-functional formal institutions is to restrict business
relationships to an already established circle of relatives or members of the same ethnic
or confessional group, leading to the development of ‘kinship clan’ networks. Second,
in the absence of any effective and transparent control over the state, its revenues
become a target for capture and official positions become avenues to rent seeking. The
investment of time, money and effort into establishing ‘friendly relations’ with civil
servants who regulate economic activities becomes an unavoidable cost of doing
business. Finally, when the police and judicial systems fail, organized criminal groups
move into the vacuum. Private arrangements ranging from the hiring of off-duty
policemen and private guard services to demands for regular ‘protection’ payments,
enforcement premiums and extortion are forms of ‘tax’ levied by organized crime.
Warfare, especially unstructured, sporadic armed conflict involving irregular and
guerrilla units opens a broad new range of opportunities for criminal groups, and the
boundaries between guerrilla and criminal activities become extremely fluid.
In a speech in October 2000, Vladimir Papava, former Georgian Minister of Economics,
declared, ‘Georgia has survived all these years thanks to the so-called shadow economy’
(Broladze 2000).11 While any estimate of the size of the informal economy is
necessarily problematic, by whatever measure a significant proportion of regional
economic activity takes place in the informal, illegal or criminal sphere.12 The most
conservative estimates indicate that at least one-third of all economic activity in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia is in the shadow sphere, other expert guesses
range up to 50 per cent or even 70 per cent (Appelbaum 2001c).
Conflict, which can grow out of struggles for the control of illegal as well as legal
resource flows, provides a market (e.g. illegal arms trading), an opportunity (drug and
alcohol smuggling, kidnapping and extortion) or a justification (criminal activities
abroad to finance patriotic wars at home) for shadow economic activity. The role of
criminal groups and ‘shady’ entrepreneurs in the Caucasian conflict should not be
underestimated, and under certain conditions can even be regarded as positive. While
Caucasian criminal groups are organized along exclusively ethnic lines, there are no
purely national shadow economies. These groups are engaged in cross-border activities
and always cooperate with partners in neighbouring states. In an institutional vacuum in
which the previous economic ties between enterprises or entire territories have been
suddenly disrupted, shadow links can provide an alternate path for transactions to
continue. The critical issue, however, is whether a temporary, emergency situation can
be allowed to establish itself as the norm.
                                                
10 David Usupashvili (cited in Lieven 2001a: 2).
11 According to Archvadze, first vice-president of the State Committee for Statistics, ‘the shadow
economy, as well as humanitarian aid, have saved Georgia in 1992-94, a period characterized by the
severest crisis, lack of money, unemployment, absolute production cut-off’. Available at:
www://isn.rsuh.ru/imemo/periodic/bulletin/fulltext/ft_zak0398r.htm.
12 A distinction is often made between informal activities which are by nature legal, but unregistered,
illegal activities, such as tax evasion, deliberate bankruptcy to avoid payment of debts, etc. and
criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping and drug smuggling.7
Shadow activities in the Caucasus include illegal entrepreneurship, racketeering, money
laundering, smuggling, criminal privatization, intentional bankruptcy, fraudulent
securities, counterfeiting, unfair competition, illegal trade, tax crimes, etc. The majority
of companies operating legally engage in large-scale tax evasion through various
schemes, including money transfers abroad with fictitious contracts, cash conversion via
counterfeit contracts, etc. ‘Violation of the administrative code qualifies as corruption,
this requires the infringed clause to be precise and unambiguous and the employee
infringing it has to receive a profit for himself, his family, friends, tribe, party or another
group connected with him’ (Tanzi 1999). By this definition, bribery and corruption are
endemic.
‘The modern sectors of the economy have decayed or collapsed. A large proportion—in
several countries, a large majority—of the working population has been pushed out of
the formal economy into the informal, grey or black economies. Partly as a
consequence, the state’s capacity to raise revenue from the economy has declined
drastically. Modern public services have decayed or collapsed altogether, from what
was often a very high level by the standards of the developing world; state servants,
instead of being paid regularly by the state, have taken to preying on the population; and
states have lost the fundamental characteristic of a modern state: the ‘effective control
of their territory and a monopoly of armed force’ (Lieven 2001b). The author sees the
‘power and strength of the extended family’ as the vital stabilizing factor, but notes that
this form of social protection has extremely negative effects on the state and
modernization. A major drawback of relying on family provision is that it tends to
concentrate risk among those least able to cope with it, limiting their access to health
care and education and making it increasingly difficult for members of the family group
to escape poverty. In addition, family provision tends to reinforce traditional gender
hierarchies within the family and to increase inequality along ethnic or confessional
lines. Unless supported by state redistribution, private provision can result in the social
exclusion of individuals, families, and population sub-groups.
According to (Lieven 2001b), this
also mean[s] that anyone with access to state funds will feel morally
obliged to share them among his relatives, and give those relatives
precedence in gaining state jobs. ... This clash of official state ethic and
social ethic … is characteristic of much of the ‘developing’ world [in
which] official laws and rules (to which everyone of course publicly pays
lip service) co-exist with – and are often subservient to – a whole range
of other ‘informal’ laws centred on family, ethnicity, criminal group or
personal allegiance.
While the concept of corruption may be somewhat ‘fuzzy’ in an environment in which
informal ties play a significant role, traditional aid to friends and relatives can still be
distinguished from graft and fraud. The structure of an organized criminal group may
reflect in practice the kinship clan structure and rely on its traditions and rules, but
kidnapping and extortion remain crimes.8
6 Poverty and conflict
The link between poverty and conflict is obviously not one of simple or direct causality.
Other parts of the Central and Eastern European region, where the dimensions of
poverty are similar, have experienced equally severe decline without succumbing to
armed struggle. Rather, poverty appears to be an enabling environment, which can
become volatile when combined with other factors, such as the presence of clear ethnic
and confessional identities in a geographically inter-mixed settlement patterns within
which separate groups remain distinct, inequality, contested control over resources, and
failure to achieve or maintain a system for the distribution of resources and adjudication
of disputes.
Trend dynamics and levels of uncertainty play a central role. A worsening trend, such as
increasing inequality, broadening and/or deepening poverty or decaying public services,
appears more likely to trigger conflict than widespread and deep poverty which shows
gradual improvement or high, but stable inequality. Finally, as demonstrated in many
regions, an authoritarian and/or corrupt regime, can maintain itself in power in the face
of persistent opposition. Clear, well-enforced rules of the game, even if they are
transparently unfair, provide a stable framework within which the majority of the
population as well as an organized opposition appear to focus on how to survive and
succeed. The uncertainty created by an arbitrary or chaotic state, however, appears to
reduce the reluctance of its opposition to risk stepping over the boundary to open
conflict and violence.
An unpredictable or incompetent regime combined with a worsening trend, would be
most likely to produce repeated or insoluble conflict, a hypothesis borne out by the
pattern of conflict in the Caucasus. We have chosen Georgia as the case study in this
article because it illustrates this worst-case scenario. Although all of the countries in the
region continue to suffer from most or all of the factors described above, including
rampant corruption, they have re-stabilized after initial conflict. Thus far, Russia’s
conflict with Chechnya has not spread to other equally poor or even poorer parts of the
North Caucasus, despite repeated attempts by Chechen groups to open other fronts.
Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite foreign intervention, widespread corruption and, in the
Azeri case, highly authoritarian government, have maintained a stable truce since their
initial war of ethnic secession. Although they remain locked in a political stalemate and
their economies continue to suffer from very high levels of poverty and inequality, they
have neither returned to conflict, nor have their minority populations rebelled or
seceded. In contrast, George continues to experience repeated bouts of conflict and the
continuing potential for its further spread.
Reviewing the experience of the Caucasus produces several observations: In clan-based
systems, the primary methods of resource transfer are inter-marriage or warfare. In
much of the FSU, the lack of independent formal institutions capable of guaranteeing
rights of ownership and control left few options for the resolution of ownership
disputes, as illustrated by the extremely high murder rates during the process of
consolidation of Russia’s financial-industrial groups and visible most recently in the
aluminium and coal industries. When control of resources or territory is legitimized by
ethnic or clan identity, the only way to expand the resource share is to take control of
another clan’s share. In a stagnant or depressed economy, the temptation to resort to
violent means of expansion is facilitated by the availability of a mass of alienated young
men, whose identify and allegiance are also clan-based.9
7 Conflict as a resource
In Russia and Azerbaijan, growth remains heavily concentrated in the energy sector. Oil
and gas production in the rest of the Caucasus does not exceed local consumption. Energy
sector profits are easily captured by a very small group and have little effect on the wider
economy. Despite the post-1998 devaluation and default bounce in  Russia,  industrial
production and employment in the Caucasus remain severely depressed at half of their
former levels or less, producing mass unemployment as well as widespread poverty in
countries with comparatively young populations (see Tables 2-8, Appendix III).
Under these conditions, the predominant forms of and motives for conflict can mutate.
The first phase may be an effort to escape from an unresponsive, unfair or even hostile
larger administrative unit in which political self-determination may be at least as
important a goal as control over economic resources (e.g. Abkhaz secession, first
Chechen War, Nagorno-Karabakh). As these conflicts become entrenched, however, a
tendency to shift to narrower political and economic interests can be observed, as
political power and with it control of economic resources can become conflict-
dependent. Since seceding from Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh’s leadership has
asserted a role in Armenian politics and interests not necessarily compatible with those
of the nation as a whole.13
The existence of a loose coalition of competing interest groups, as seen for example in
Afghanistan, Chechnya, and both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, vastly
complicate the process of reaching a settlement. In addition to conflict over the control
of resources, conflict itself can become a resource. Geopolitical interest in either
stabilizing or de-stabilizing the region, for example, has drawn resource flows as
disparate as Islamic fundamentalist funding for Chechen guerrilla groups and
international financial institutional support to the government of Georgia. National
diasporas in the West (primarily Armenian), as well as more recent emigrants to Russia
and other CIS countries, contribute to ‘defending the homeland’. In addition, as noted
above, conflict provides a favourable environment for organized criminal groups and for
irregular armed groups, which engage in both military and criminal activities
(kidnapping, drug and arms trading, and money laundering are practised not only by
Chechen groups, but also by others throughout the region). Finally, economic
breakdown and the collapse of formal employment release large numbers of young men
for whom conflict becomes a form of economic activity.
A return to conflict can be avoided only if a stable and predictable system of rules can
be established. Reconstruction will be successful if a gradual improvement can be
reliably anticipated, even if real reductions of poverty and inequality will only be
experienced by the next generation. Once mobilized, ethnic grievances create an
enormous barrier, however, grievances should be possible to overcome if the rewards of
cooperation are great enough. Finally, agreements, including peace agreements, must be
enforceable and the sanctions against violence must be effective to convince the
                                                
13 On 27 October 1999, Vazgen Sargisian, the Armenian Prime Minister, Karen Demirchian, Speaker of
Parliament, and six MPs were assassinated when armed men from Nagorno-Karabakh attacked the
Armenian parliament. Although the men were arrested and prosecuted, the attack was never clearly
explained. Strobe Talbot, former US diplomat involved in the negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, who had left Yerevan a few hours prior to the attack, stated that the parties had been
‘very, very close to peace’. The shootings derailed Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations (Aliev 2001).10
members of all social groups that they will benefit and that the rewards of cooperation
are reliably greater than those of conflict.
In the absence of either simple territorial solutions or clear economic incentives to
peace, stalemates or low-level conflict may be of advantage to most or all of the
contesting parties. External resource flows can continue, captured internal resource
flows do not have to be shared, state failures can be excused as resulting from the
conflict, and the difficult tasks of disbanding armed groups and reviving the economy
can be postponed. The majority of conflicts are now low-level stalemates. The most
important first step toward conflict resolution in the region is to identify methods of
discouraging continued conflict and rewarding cooperative behaviour. This would
require commitment on the part of external actors to stop rewarding conflict and begin
funding cooperative activity. A further commitment to reducing uncertainty and
extending the time horizon of elite calculations would reduce the centrality of asset
stripping and conflict as a resource and make mutual cooperation financially more
rewarding to the conflicting parties.
The resources of the Caucasus are not concentrated or easily transportable (such as gold
or diamonds) and thus cannot be easily captured by any party (Addison and Murshed
2002; Auty 1998). Oil and gas, the highest value resources that do exist, require
extensive transport infrastructure, highlighting the fact that the most valuable regional
resource is transit itself: access to markets is a non-substitutable intermediate input.
Although the case of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline illustrates that the rewards of oil and gas
transit can be easily captured by a narrow elite, this capture was enabled by geopolitical
players and remains vulnerable to disruption by disgruntled competitors.
The geographical location of the Caucasus is a bridge between Europe and Asia as well
as between Russia and the Middle East. The explosive growth of smuggling throughout
the region relies on active cooperation between ostensible enemies, to their mutual
economic benefit. The key to the economic revitalization of the formal economy is
regional economic cooperation to facilitate trade and increased investment to develop
other sources of employment. Multilateral agreements are required, because no pair of
countries can resolve the transit problem without the cooperation of their neighbours,
and are also to be preferred to bilateral solutions as a means of increasing the costs of
violation to any individual party.
Current pipeline politics should be seen in this light. The oil and gas sector, as
abundantly shown elsewhere (Auty 2001), is perhaps the least likely to prove a positive
factor in promoting stability and a return to growth in the absence of a functioning
social contract and regional cooperation. A further step in recovery requires a shift away
from natural resource extraction and petty trade toward food processing and
manufacturing, which would also serve to draw more of the population back into the
formal labour force. Activities must be identified which reward cooperative behaviour
on the part of two or more ethno-confessional or other competing groups, especially at
the sub-elite level, to reinforce non-conflict behaviour and reduce the ability of elite to
mobilize ethnic-based grievances. A significant additional problem is posed by the
negotiating parties’ lack of credibility in commitments to one another and a lack of trust
in the authorities on the part of the population (Addison and Murshed 2001; Azam
2001). Here, the experience of other regions with ‘commitment technologies’ could be
of central importance.11
Resolution of the conflicts in the Caucasus can be compared to a very complex puzzle.
Attempts to solve individual parts of the puzzle in isolation from the rest, to separate the
North Caucasus from the Trans-Caucasus, or cut a deal between Georgia and
Azerbaijan, while excluding Armenia, will ultimately fail. Any solution will depend on
addressing the region as a whole.
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Appendix I: Corruption: the case of Georgia
Corruption has long since become the norm in economic and social
behaviour. This is neither bad nor good. It is an historically established
norm (Timofeev 2000).
Georgia is a case in which geopolitical interests and the ‘social ethic’ intersect. This
leads to conflicts, which in turn provide a fertile environment for shadow activity. The
oil and gas industry, the most profitable sector of the formal economy, provides an
example of how both serve the interests of the elite, at great cost to the vast majority of
the population.
After the Russian defeat in the first Chechen war, the US expanded its activities in the
Caucasus, supporting Georgia and Azerbaijan against Russia. Georgia was instrumental
in establishing the US-sponsored GUUAM group as a counter to the CIS, participated in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and declared its desire to join NATO.
Georgia also strongly endorsed the US-backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, which is
designed to deny Caspian oil transit to both Russia and Iran, at significant added cost of
construction. Georgia has become, on a per capita basis, the third largest recipient of US
aid, and currently has World Bank projects worth over US$100 million, as well as
assistance from other international donors (Socor 2001: 9). As Lieven (2001a) notes,
‘Unfortunately, the greater part of this aid appears to have been stolen or otherwise
squandered by the Georgian ruling elites’.
Georgia has three major business groups active in this sector, all associated with
President Eduard Shevardnadze. The state oil company, Gruznefteprodukty, is run by a
political associate of the president, who ‘routinely conceals information about oil
profits’.14 The Inaco Company, a large petrol importer, is directed by Giorgy
Akhvlediana, brother of Shevardnadze’s daughter-in-law. Inaco formed a joint-stock
company with Gruznefteprodukty, after which the joint board of directors transferred
the shares held by the state-owned company to Inaco, leaving Gruznefteprodukty nearly
bankrupt. Iveria Plus, the largest petrol transporter in Georgia, is owned by Nugzar
Shevardnadze, nephew of Eduard, who has been accused of defrauding a Greek oil firm
of US$5 million (using a false intermediary), smuggling and tax evasion. Investigations
did not result in charges. According to Usuprashvili, head of the Georgian Coordinating
Council to Combat Corruption, ‘You can’t be doing business in oil and gasoline in
Georgia and not be to at least some extent involved in smuggling or selling smuggled
gasoline’ (Dixon 2001: 1-2).
A review of import documentation showed that only the US Embassy in Georgia, which
imported gasoline from Azerbaijan for its own needs, had paid customs duties on the
real price of US$260 per ton. In 1999 the customs service contributed US$277 million
to the state budget. Experts estimate that collusion between smugglers and customs
inspectors cost the budget double that amount annually, or more than the annual state
budget of US$500 million.15 Georgia’s tax collection rate of 15 per cent of GDP is one
of the lowest in the region and its public services correspondingly under-funded, with
catastrophic effects on health and education (UNDP’s NHDR for Georgia 1999: 48-9).
                                                
14 Will James, PA Consulting cited in Appelbaum (2001b).
15 From: www.geocities.com/geo_corruption/Bullet’artic2.htm.15
Western disillusionment with Shevardnadze after his massively rigged April 2000 re-
election, led to increasing pressure to confront endemic corruption. In March 2001,
Shevardnadze signed a decree forming a 12-member Coordinating Council to Combat
Corruption to carry out the ‘task of eradicating this horrible disease from our society’
and the Minister of State Property Management was dismissed, not charged with
corruption, but for ‘inability to prevent others from indulging in illegal activity
connected with state assets’ (Bit-Suleiman 2001).
Since then Shevardnadze has publicized various measures to combat corruption with
funding from USAID and other Western aid organization. Little, however, has changed.
Reform efforts, such as a proposed law for the confiscation of illegally gained property,
has failed to be enacted. The leaders of the reform faction of the Citizens Union of
Georgia of which Shevardnadze was the chair, including the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Finance, have resigned in protest and gone into opposition after
Shevardnadze abandoned them in favour of friends and family previously exposed as
corrupt.
In August 2001, a letter from Judy O’Connor, the World Bank country director for
Georgia, to Mr Shevardnadze was leaked to the press (Stern 2001a: 8). Ms O’Connor
wrote objecting to an agreement setting the transit fee through the Georgian section of
the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at US$2.00 per 1,000 bcm, noting that comparable
world market rates were a minimum of US$5.00 per 1,000 bcm, rising to US$10 over
the 20 year life of the contract. Ms O’Connor noted that the lower tariff would reduce
revenues to the Georgian budget (Socor 2001).
US Assistant Secretary of State, Elizabeth Jones, immediately intervened, stating that:
The tariff is, in a certain sense, a side issue, and it is unfortunate that the
World Bank … completely and totally missed the point. Georgia is a
critical element in the energy transportation route from the Caspian
Sea/Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe. The strategic position of Georgia
is priceless. The World Bank cannot compare Georgia to any other
country in terms of the tariff. It is a completely different situation (Socor
2001).16
Ilham Aliev, vice-president of the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) and son of
Azeri President Haidar Aliev, (and his designated successor as president) also expressed
his displeasure with the World Bank stating, ‘it should not interfere in this sort of thing’
(Socor 2001).
In September 2001, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement on the transit,
transport and sale of natural gas for planned pipeline with a maximum transit tariff of
US$5 per 1,000 bcm of gas over 20 years (Stern 2001b: 8). In September 2002, an
official ceremony in Baku marked the beginning of construction (IWPR).
In Azerbaijan, the clan state has been more successful in preserving its territorial
integrity than in Georgia, but no more dedicated to serving its citizens. Although state
                                                
16 Although one might think that a ‘priceless’ strategic position would result in a higher price, this was
not Ms Jones’ intended meaning.16
oil funds designed to bankroll social projects have experienced difficulties elsewhere,
the IMF pledged US$100 million into Azerbaijan’s oil fund in July 2001 (Appelbaum
2001b). A month later, the Azerbaijani government announced that its oil fund would
devote US$3.40 per month to feeding the over 500,000 persons displaced in the war
with Armenia (Appelbaum 2001a: 3).17
Appendix II: Caucasus conflicts
Armenia—Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan and the Lezghins
Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region
Armenian ethnic majority pocket in southwestern Azerbaijan that is entirely surrounded
by Azeri territory. In addition, Nakhichevan autonomous republic, bordered by
Armenia, Turkey and Iran, is an Azeri ethnic majority province and administratively
part of Azerbaijan but physically separated from it by Armenia. By 1989, virtually
entire ethnic Armenian population had left the enclave.
Background: Centuries of mixed settlement patterns and population movements. In
1850, 80 per cent of population within the current boundaries of Armenia were Azeri; in
1900, the majority of the population of Baku was Armenian and Russian (Suny 1993;
Zubov 2000). Bloody clashes and Azeri mob attacks on Armenians and Jews in Baku in
1905 and 1918. Late-Soviet riots in Sumgait in 1988, in which a number of Armenians
were injured and several killed by Azeri mobs, produced a first wave of Armenian
refugees to Armenia. Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh formally requested transfer of
the region to Armenia in 1988, which Moscow rejected. In 1989, Armenia called for
reunification with Nagorno-Karabakh. After a short period of direct rule from Moscow,
Nagorno-Karabakh voted for full independence in January 1992 (Armenian ethnic
population constituted 75 per cent). In response, Azerbaijan abrogated Nagorno-
Karabakh’s autonomous status, which triggered open warfare in 1992-93. Nagorno-
Karabakh forces, supported by Armenia, took control of seven adjacent Azeri districts
(10 per cent of Azerbaijani territory) including those districts separating it from
Armenia. Since 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh has functioned as an unrecognized state with
its own president and a federated part of Armenia (Emerson et al. 2000).
Current situation: Truce has held since 1994. Armenia currently holds approximately 10
per cent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Azerbaijan has received 250,000 ethnic Azeri
refugees from Armenia and 576,000 displaced persons from occupied territories as well
as 50,000 Meskhetian Turks who fled ethnic conflict in Uzbekistan. Armenia received
380,000 ethnic Armenians primarily from Azerbaijan, as well as Georgia. Refugee
groups remain poorly integrated.17 The 1999 peace negotiations ended with the murder
of the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament (Karen Demirchian) and several deputies in
                                                
17 ‘The refugees inability to speak the mother tongue often complicates the integration process. ... The
successful integration of the refugees was also hindered by the fact that urban residents
overwhelmingly outnumbered rural residents among those who moved to Armenia from Azerbaijan.
The Armenian authorities proposed two options to these refugees: a hostel in Yerevan or a private
house in a rural area. However, the latter implied a loss of any opportunities for vocational
employment ... by choosing to stay in town, the refugee for many years was doomed to live in a hostel
and to hold a menial job due to severe unemployment. The final choice and decision for many
refugees ... was emigration to Russia and Western countries’ (UNDP’s NHRD for Armenia 1999: 28,
29, 44-5).
‘Azerbaijan’s IDP’s and refugees are entitled to free housing and utilities ... The economic crisis and
the Government’s limited revenue-raising capacity, however have made it impossible to fulfill this
commitment ... The majority of the displaced have inadequate shelter, poor access to clean water and
sanitary services and severely limited supplies of energy’ (UNDP’s NHDR for Azerbaijan
1999: 48-9).18
a terrorist attack. The 2001 negotiations, reported close to resolution, have again ceased.
Armenia remains blockaded by Azerbaijan to the east and Turkey to the west.
The Lezghins
A distinct linguistic and ethnic group of approximately 400,000 (1989 census) which
straddles the border between northeastern Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation
Republic of Daghestan. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of
Azerbaijan, the Lezghins have organized politically to protest discrimination by the
Baku government, objecting to their physical separation by the new border and
requesting independent status. In 1993, Lezghin demonstrations led to violent clashes
with the Azeri police. Already at war with Armenia, the Azeri government agreed to
cooperate with Daghestan on Lezghin issues and reached an agreement on an informal
border regime with Daghestan and Russia.
Economic situation: In 1999 Armenian GDP was 43.4 per cent of its 1989 level (see
Appendix Table 2). In addition to the costs of economic transition, war, a major
earthquake and the 1998 Russian economic crisis, the Turkish and Azerbaijani
blockades have put pressure on Armenia’s only accessible neighbours, Georgia and
Iran. Georgia has taken advantage of the situation by further increasing transport
charges on Armenian goods shipped through its territory. Armenia has received support
from several international donors supplementing that of the Armenian Diaspora.
Re-established trade with Russia and increased trade with the Middle East created trade
deficits, resulting in large negative current account balances (25.5 per cent of GDP in
1998). Investment levels remain low and corruption and shadow economic activity are
major problems.
Azerbaijan’s 1999 GDP was 51.2 per cent of its 1989 level, from a low point of 42 per
cent in 1994/5 (see Appendix Table 2). An IBRD/IMF stabilization and reform
programme initiated in 1995 brought inflation and budget deficits under control,
however the country ran a 33 per cent of GDP current account deficit in 1998, financed
by FDI flows of approximately US$1 billion, primarily into the expanding oil and gas
sector. Azerbaijan has also received significant international aid, totalling US$369
million between 1992 and 1999 (Stability Pact 2000). Despite Azerbaijan’s current oil
incomes and strong foreign aid and investment record, general government expenditures
are extremely low and public services minimal. Real wages are significantly lower in
comparison to 1989 than in Armenia or Georgia, inequality has risen rapidly, and a
large proportion of the population lives in severe poverty. Malnutrition and anaemia are
common in children, especially among refugees and displaced persons. Transparency
International lists Azerbaijan as among the most corrupt countries in the world.
Georgia—Abkhazia, Adjaria, Javakheti, South Ossetia and the Pankisi Gorge
Background: Abkhazia—Georgian and Abkhaz nationalities both have old, well-
established ethnic identities, cultures and religions (Eastern Orthodox and Muslim,
respectively). During the Soviet period Abkhazia, the northern coastal zone including
the port of Sukhumi, was an autonomous republic within the Georgian republic. The
Abkhaz leadership, prior to the dissolution of the USSR, made several attempts to be
reassigned from Georgian to Russian administration. The population of Abkhazia in the
last Soviet census of 1989 was 18 per cent Abkhaz, 45 per cent Georgian (Stability Pact
2000), the remainder being Russian and other North Caucasus ethnic groups.19
The April 1989 clash between Soviet troops and a Georgian mob Abkhaz delegates
walking out of the parliament and declaring independence. Efforts of the Zviad
Gamsakhurdia government to maintain territorial integrity led to open warfare in 1992
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia between Georgian troops and the Confederation of the
Peoples of the Caucasus, led by V. Ardzinba, which received support from Russian
troops stationed in Abkhazia. After Georgian troops were defeated, between 250,000
and 300,000 Georgian ethnic refugees fled the region.
Current situation: A UN observer mission was deployed in 1993 to monitor a ceasefire,
although there are occasional armed clashes. A Russian peacekeeping force is stationed
in Abkhazia, mostly patrolling the Gali region, the population of which was 90 per cent
Georgian before the war. Despite an agreement on non-use of force signed by
Shevardnadze and Ardzinba in 1997 under UN auspices, Georgian paramilitary groups,
tolerated by the Georgian government, are active in Gali and neighbouring regions.
After protracted unsuccessful negotiations on future status, Abkhazia held a referendum
on 3 October 1999 (contested because much of the pre-war population did not
participate), and subsequently formally declared independence. Abkhazia is not
recognized by any state and is officially under blockade by both Russia and Georgia.
In August 2001, Abkhazia withdrew from UN-sponsored peace talks after two terrorist
attacks were blamed on Georgian guerrilla groups. In late August a concentration of
several hundred Chechens guerrillas and Georgian paramilitaries was detected near the
Abkhaz border. Their subsequent movement into the Khodori gorge, which runs
between Abkhaz and Georgian territory, was denied by Georgian officials until a
helicopter carrying UN observers was shot down on 8 October, killing nine. Two days
later 14 villagers were killed in a guerrilla raid, provoking active combat. Georgia
accused Russia of violating its airspace and demanded that Russian peacekeeping troops
withdraw and be replaced by a UN force. Abkhazia asked to affiliate with Russia,
claiming to have bombed and repulsed the Chechen and Georgian guerrillas itself.
Russia stated that its planes were not involved, that it respects Georgia’s territorial
integrity and will withdraw troops as requested. As of this writing, Georgia and
Abkhazia have returned to the negotiating table.
Adjaria
An autonomous region located in the  southwest coastal zone bordering Turkey
including the port of Batumi, with a population of 400,000, of whom 392,000 (1989
census) were Muslim, many of whom speak a Turkic dialect. There has been no armed
conflict, but significant tensions over economic and political issues, including non-
transfer of federal payments and parallel non-transfer of port and customs duties.
Adjarian President Abashidze encourages the presence of Russian military bases in
Batumi, while Tbilisi denies Batumi transport projects. Adjaria is de facto beyond
Georgian administrative control.
South Ossetia
An autonomous region located in north  central Georgia, directly to the south of the
North Ossetian autonomous republic, and a member of the Russian Federation. Prior to
1989, of a total Ossetian population of 600,000 (1989 census), 350,000 lived in North
Ossetia, with the remainder divided between South Ossetia, Georgia and Chechen-
Ingushetia. In the late 1980s South Ossetia began to push for greater autonomy,
requesting promotion to the status of autonomous republic in 1989. The response of20
Georgian nationalist militias led to open warfare in 1991-92, as a result of which
approximately 100,000 ethnic Ossetians fled Georgia for either North or South Ossetia.
many South Ossetians also fled north and the ethnic Georgian population of South
Ossetia withdrew to Georgia proper. South Ossetian referendum in favour of unification
with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation in 1992 was supported by many
Russian leaders and nearly led to war between Georgia and Russia. The June 1992
meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze produced a cease-fire and a joint Russian-
Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force. By late 1997, communication links between
Georgia and South Ossetia were reopened, however, agreed refugee repatriation has not
taken place and South Ossetia is de facto independent. The North-South Ossetia
corridor is a major route for smuggling illegal alcohol and tobacco into Russia.
Samskhe-Javakheti
Located in southwestern Georgia bordering Armenia, over 90 per cent of the population
of Javakheti is ethnic Armenian (approximately 235,000). Demands in the late 1980s for
the preservation of Armenian culture and economic support from Tbilisi escalated into
calls for autonomy or incorporation into Armenia. Tensions rose in 1994 when
Javakheti was merged with Meskhet and an ethnic Georgian was appointed to represent
the region. There has been no open conflict and Armenia has played a very cautious
role, as Georgia provides its only transport route north, but strongly supports Russia’s
military presence in Akhalkalaki. Georgia continues to demand the closure of the base,
the only remaining large employer in the region.
The Pankisi Gorge
Located in the mountainous region of eastern Georgia on the border with Chechnya, the
area hosts a concentration of Chechen refugees. Despite official Georgian denials, the
Pankisi gorge was a safe haven for Chechen guerrillas who turned it into a no-go area
for Georgian security forces. Use of the area as a base for kidnapping and other criminal
activities inside Georgia has led to demonstrations by the local Georgian population,
demanding that the government take measures against Chechen criminals. After
multiple incidents and Georgian protests at Russian violation of their territory, the US
Equip and Train programme provided US$62 for the Georgian military. The death of a
British journalist, Roderick Scott, on 26 September 2002 during a cross-border foray
into Ingushetia left a film record of the use of Pankisi as a Chechen base area. Georgia
and Russia subsequently agreed to join patrols of the area (IWPR 2002).
Economic situation: Georgia has lost control of its lucrative tourist regions as well as its
trade and transport links north. The major land corridor north (road and rail) runs
through Abkhazia and is blockaded, while the alternate road routes are controlled by
South Ossetia. Of its three Black Sea ports, Sukhumi is in Abkhazia, Batumi is in
Adjaria, which has declined to transfer port and customs duties, and Poti, the only port
in Georgian ethnic majority territory, is controlled by a clan not sympathetic to the
Shevardnadze administration. In addition to the ethnic conflicts described above,
Shevardnadze came to power in 1992, after orchestrating a coup to depose President
Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The October 1993 defeat in Abkhazia was followed by a renewed
revolt in western Georgia by Gamsakhurdia supporters. Georgia was essentially in a
state of civil war until Gamsakhurdia’s death in 1995 under unclear circumstance.
During this period, the country was effectively divided into a series of territories
controlled by armed militias and clans.21
In 1999, Georgian GDP was 32 per cent of its 1989 level (although as throughout the
region, the extent of shadow economic activity is significant) and the budget is
dependent on international donors. Georgia had received US$510 million in IBRD
assistance by 1999 as well as EU, World Bank and other IFI assistance. In 1993, the
Georgian government virtually ceased funding health care and education (and only a
fraction of those funds budgeted reach their intended recipients, as documented in the
1999 NHDR, see notes to Appendix Table 6). Corruption is endemic and the level of
public services has declined to the point that there are frequent water and power outages
even in the capital, Tbilisi. While there is no open conflict at present, the central
government’s control, even of those areas with majority Georgian population, is
tenuous.
Russia—North Caucasus: Chechnya, Ingushetia-North Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia
Chechnya
First Chechen War 1994-96—Escalating demands for increased autonomy from the
Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a unilateral declaration
of independence in 1994. Russia responded with a military invasion, and Chechen
irregular forces united under Dzhokhar Dudayev. After Dudayev’s death in a missile
attack, Chechen forces began to splinter into semi-autonomous group commanders. A
peace agreement negotiated by Russian General Alexander Lebed, postponed the
question of official independence, but allowed Chechnya broad de facto autonomy.
Aslan Maskhadov, a moderate Islamist, was elected president in February 1997 and
attempted to establish a government of national unity and control over armed groups.
The resignation of Shamil Basayev, one of the more recognized field commanders, as
defence minister signalled Maskhadov’s failure to establish central control and a
devolution to clan control. By 1998, Maskhadov controlled two districts of Grozny,
while the rest of Chechnya was divided among clan ‘commanders’.
Second Chechen War 1999—Began with an incursion into Dagestan by an armed group
led by Shamil Basayev and Khattab in September/October 1999, asserting the
independence of the villages of Botlikh and Novopolakskovo as part of an ‘Islamic
Republic’. Prior to the beginning of this round, 45 per cent of the Chechen population
(approximately 1 million in 1994) had fled, with the largest refugee population in
Ingushetia. The current war is possibly the result of a Russian provocation connected
with Putin’s presidential candidacy, possibly a Chechen strategy to leverage outside
resources, possibly an outside provocation by Islamic groups or oil interests,
geopolitical players interested in unrest on Russia’s southern flank, or all of the above.
Current situation: After two years of continuing warfare, the majority of the pre-war
civilian population has left Chechnya for relatives or refugee camps in other parts of
Russia or the FSU. Virtually no formal economy remains. What is left of the civilian
population is engaged in subsistence farming or is in some way involved in conflict-
related shadow or criminal economic activities. The distinctions between militias,
guerrillas and bandits are vague, at best. Since the first war, these groups financed their
activities most visibly through kidnapping for ransom, eventually forcing business
interests, international aid groups, and news media to withdraw their personnel.
However, their primary targets have been other Chechens. Other major sources of
income are arms and drug smuggling, money laundering, remittances from Chechen
organized crime groups in Russia and Europe, and foreign donors.22
Ingushetia-North Ossetia
Historical background: The deportation of Chechen and Ingush (among other)
nationalities in 1944-45 for collaboration with the German occupation and the
resettlement of Ossetians and Russian, produced tensions over land rights when the
Chechen and Ingush were allowed to return in the mid-1950s. Open clashes in 1990-91,
associated with unrest in general as well as the Chechen uprising in particular, produced
a wave of Ossetian refugees fleeing Ingushetia, primarily for North Ossetia. Despite
repeated attempts at resolution, these refugees have not been allowed to return. When
Chechnya declared independence, Ingushetia, which until then had been part of the
Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic, declined to secede from the Russian Federation.
Ingushetia has since absorbed the majority of Chechen refugees.
Karachai-Cherkessia
Experienced some clashes, but no open warfare between the three major ethnic groups
in the region—the Karachai, Circassians and Kazaks—apparently due to the abrogation
of a trilateral power- and resource-sharing agreement which had been in place
throughout the Soviet period.
Economic situation: The North Caucasus comprises roughly 2 per cent of Russian
territory and is one of Russia’s more densely settled regions. It is also one of the
poorest. Per capita income in the North Caucasus in 1998 was slightly less than
two-thirds and monthly wages were 57 per cent of the Russian averages.18 While all of
the North Caucasus administrative units discussed here (except Krasnodar) have per
capita GRP, average wages, and industrial production levels well below the Russian
average, there is considerable variation within the region, with the ethnic republics
among the poorest in the Federation. Stavropol, Krasnodar and Adigeya, with mixed
economies of light industry, agriculture and tourism and Kabardino-Balkaria with
agriculture and food processing industry are around the regional average. Karachai-
Cherkessia’s well-established small and medium agricultural production also places it
near the regional average. North Ossetia has sustained a moderate standard of living on
the basis of an extremely large Russian military presence and its role as the transit
corridor for tax-free alcohol from Europe via Georgia to Russia. Daghestan and
Ingushetia have the lowest standards of living in the region and at about 20 per cent of
the average, and rank among the very poorest members the Russian Federation (see
Appendix Tables 1 and 5). Ingushetia, which has absorbed the majority of Chechen
refugees, obtained special status as an offshore zone and with it trade and financial
operations incomes. Daghestan receives over 80 per cent of its revenues as transfers
from the federal budget intended to guarantee minimal social protection and regional
stability in a region mostly dependent on subsistence agriculture and small trading. The
social and economic situation in Chechnya can best be described as catastrophic
(Kosikov and Kosikova 1999; Severnii Kavkaz 2000). In one author’s delicate phrase,
‘In all of the above cases, politics continue to play a crucial role in the legal and semi-
legal distribution of resources organised by local political elites’ (Stability Pact
2000: 11).
                                                
18 North Caucasus per capita monthly income 616 rubles compared to 970 rubles Russian average;
average monthly wage 635 rubles North Caucasus compared to 1095 rubles Russian average. Federal
Targeted Programme for the Economic and Social Political Development of the North Caucasus to
2005, p. 21.23















Armenia 3.1 29,743 1,541  892 2,559
Azerbaijan 7.9 86,600 1,067  431 2,936
Georgia 5.4 69,700 2,115  703 2,664










Adigeya  447,900  7,600 2,028  43 39.1
Chechnya  500,000 est. 12,800* n.a.  n.a. n.a.
Daghestan 2,142,700 50,300 1,649  21 32.5
Ingushetia  314,900  6,500*  859  20 15.8
Kabardino-
Balkaria
 785,500 12,500 2,162  35 70.2
Karachai-
Cherkessia
 431,300 14,100 2,211  41 43.7
Krasnodar krai  5,076,000 76,000 3,328  65 107.4
North Ossetia  670,100  8,000 1,496  37 53.9
Stavropol krai 2,659,800 66,500 2,952  72 68.0
Sources: Data for 1995 and 1998 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russian Federation, Russian
Republics are from UNDP’s Human Development Report (2000: 179) and the data for 2000 from
Human Development Report (2002: 191) (calculation method changed from constant dollars to
PPP). Data for the Russian republics are from Russian State Committee for Statistics (1992-
2000) and Goskomstat (2001); real per capita GDP in USD are from UNDP’s NHDR for Armenia
2000.
Note:   * The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic divided into two separate republics in 1991, exact
boundaries between the Chechen Autonomous Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia have
not been established.
Resources
The Caucasus is one of the poorer regions of the FSU. The level of industrial
development is relatively low, but a comparatively profitable sub-tropical agriculture,
enoculture and tourism on the Black Sea coast, and to a much lesser extent on the
Caspian are significant sources of income. None of its resources are compact, high
value and easily transportable (such as gold and diamonds). In addition, they are very
unequally distributed. Azerbaijan has significant oil and gas (proven reserves of one
billion tons, as estimated by British Petroleum-Amoco). Between 1995 and 1998 fuel
constituted roughly half of total Azeri industrial production, with 1998 revenues of
US$474,900,000. Georgia produced roughly 200,000 tons per year and pre-war
Chechnya was also a net oil exporter. Armenian claims to have found oil remain
unconfirmed. Oil and gas production in the rest of the Caucasus (natural resources map)
serves primarily local energy needs.24
The region’s major economic and political resource is its geographical location, which
is reflected in relatively dense endowment of roads, rail and pipeline transport networks
and ports as well as oil processing facilities (see transport map). Control over legal and
especially illegal trade flows plays a major role in regional conflicts.
Appendix Table 2
Real GDP growth/real average wage growth (1989 = 100)
Real GDP 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Armenia 100 92.6 76.8 44.7 40.7 42.9 45.9 48.6 50.2 53.8 55.6 59.0 63.1
Azerbaijan 100 88.3 87.7 67.9 52.2 41.9 37.0 37.4 39.6 43.6 46.8 52.0 56.2
Georgia 100 67.6 69.6 38.4 28.6 25.4 26.0 28.7 31.8 32.7 33.7 34.4 35.4
Russia 100 96.0 91.2 78.0 71.2 62.2 59.6 57.5 58.0 55.2 58.2 63.0 66.5
Real wage growth
Armenia 100 107.7 72.3 39.6 6.3 16.8 20.0 29.0 26.2 31.9 35.1 39.8 n.a.
Azerbaijan 100 101.1 80.0 95.0 62.4 24.8 19.8 22.5 34.4 42.0 50.2 59.3 n.a.
Georgia 100 111.2 76.5 50.5 24.1 33.5 28.3 42.2 57.0 71.5 73.2 89.7 n.a.
Russia 100 109.1 102.4 68.9 69.1 63.7 45.9 52.0 54.5 47.2 38.2 46.1 n.a.
Source: TransMONEE database (2002).
Appendix Table 3a
Oil and gas production







Source: Russian Ministry of Energy (2000).
Appendix Table 3b
Regional economy Β  industrial gross output rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Armenia -28.0 5.6 2.6 1.2 0.9 -2.5
Azerbaijan -6.3 -8.9 -30.4 -19.7 -24.8 -21.4 -6.7 0.2 2.2
Georgia -24.4 -43.3 -21.0 -39.1 -9.9 6.8 8.1 -
Russia -0.1 -8.0 -18.0 -14.1 -20.9 -3.3 -4.0 1.9 -5.2
Source: TransMONEE database (2000).25
Appendix Table 3c
Regional economy—share of agricultural sector in GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Armenia 17.3 20.1 28.7 46.3 41.8 36.7 31.7 30.2 34.2
Azerbaijan 26.0 30.4 25.9 26.9 32.2 25.1 24.7 20.0
Georgia 54.5 67.7 28.7 38.0 31.0 28.2 26.1
Russia 13.4 8.5 6.8 9.6 9.8 7.1 6.5
Source: TransMONEE database (2000).
Appendix Table 3d







The relatively low figures for registered unemployed shown in Appendix Table 4 reflect
the fact that unemployment registration systems have only recently been introduced in
these countries and that the level of unemployment benefits is extremely low.
Appendix Table 4
Registered unemployment: as a percentage of the economically active population
(Russian regional figures for the end of each year)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Armenia - - - 1.6 5.3 6.1 6.6 9.3 10.6 9.3 11.2 11.7
Azerbaijan - - 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Georgia - - 0.2 2.3 6.6 3.6 2.6 2.4 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.9
Russian average - - 0.1 0.8 1.1 2.2 3.2 3.4 2.8 2.7 1.7 1.4
Adigeya 2.9 1.4 1.3
Chechen
Daghestan 5.6 6.6 6.0
Ingushetia 17.4 12.2 13.5
Kabardino-Balkaria 3.1 2.1 2.6
Karachai-Circassia 1.4 1.2 1.4
Krasnodar krai 1.5 0.8 0.7
North Ossetia 3.7 2.7 2.5
Stavropol krai 1.5 1.1 0.9
Source: TransMONEE database (2000); Goskomstat (Handbook, 1998) and Goskomstat (2001).26
For example, registered unemployment rose sharply in Armenia in early 1999 when
family allowances were introduced, because registration of unemployed status was a
condition of eligibility. In addition, informal and shadow economic activities are
widespread. Real unemployment is estimated as considerably higher than the registered
level in all of these countries. In several of the Russian Republics (in particular
Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria) estimates using ILO methods (which
count those with any hours of formal employment as employed), suggest rates of over
52 per cent and up to 85-90 per cent among ethnic Balkarians. Youth unemployment in
the formal economy is a major problem, with rates in the North Caucasus ranging up to
70 per cent.
Poverty
While it is obvious that poverty and inequality in the region have increased sharply,
accurate assessments of both income poverty and real poverty are hampered throughout
the region by the lack of accurate and comparable data. Given the prevalence of
informal economic activity, wages frequently represent only a fraction of household
money incomes and in-kind incomes may represent a major additional resource. The
clearest picture of real poverty levels is provided by household data surveys, which in
many areas remain to be conducted. In their absence, infant and maternal mortality rates
and other health data such as rising preventable disease and death rates or declining
primary school enrolments provide indications of declining living standards. Together
with sharply reduced public health and education expenditures (even where the share of
GDP remains steady, GDP itself has been reduced by more than 50 per cent) and
inadequate government transfers, these factors can produce extreme and socially
destabilizing declines in social welfare and social cohesion.
According to the Georgian Center for Strategic Research and Development,
approximately 49.6 per cent of Georgian residents earn less than the monthly
subsistence wage (102 lari) and the number of families with less than a below-poverty
line 300 lari/month constituted 74 per cent of all households (UNDP’s NHDR for
Georgia 1999: 16). The poverty headcount in Georgia remained at 46.1 per cent in
2001, 45 per cent of the population had incomes sufficient to provide less than 2,100
Kcal/day (UNDP’s NHDR for Georgia, 2001-02). In Armenia, the average salary
amounts to roughly half of the subsistence minimum (which is divided 47 : 53 into food
and non-food components). The minimum wage and minimum pension are equal to
between 8-11 per cent of the subsistence minimum. According to the Armenia NHDR,
41 per cent of Armenian families have an average per capita income of less than 47 per
cent of the subsistence minimum (that is, less than sufficient to purchase minimally
adequate nutrition, ignoring non-food expenses), and another 43 per cent have incomes
below the full subsistence minimum (UNDP’s NHDR for Armenia 1999: 29-30). The
situation in Azerbaijan is less well quantified. Since 1994, food has comprised nearly 70
per cent of total average household expenditures, without being sufficient to ensure a
healthy diet. A 1996 survey conducted jointly by USAID, WHO and UNICEF found
nearly one quarter of Azeri children to be malnourished and more than 40 per cent
suffering from anaemia. Sharp and contradictory swings in maternal mortality and
infant mortality rates, not reflected in life expectancy statistics create doubts as to the
reliability of various indicators (UNDP’s NHDR for Azerbaijan 1999: 29, 34, 35). In
2000, Azerbaijanis continued to dedicate an average of 64.3 per cent of household27
income to food purchases, indicating continuing high rates of poverty (UNDP’s NHDR
for Azerbaijan 2001: 34).
The Russian figures in Appendix Table 5 are official government statistics, which
shows roughly 20 to 30 per cent of the population below the subsistence minimum. The
UNDP’s NHDR for Russia (1999, 2000 and 2001) suggest significantly higher figures
of those in poverty, about double those of Goskomstat (UNDP’s NHDR for Russia
1999: 158 and 2001: 43). This variation can be explained by the application of different
definitions of poverty. Official data released in October 2000, showed 36.7 per cent of
the population, or 52 million people, with incomes below the subsistence minimum
(itself less than US$1 per day, 67 per cent of which is required for minimal nutrition),
although another calculation method for the same period produced a total of 44 million.
This is partly the result of an extremely low official minimum wage which affects all
public sector employees. As indicated in Appendix Table 5, income poverty rates in the
Caucasus have consistently been more than double the Russian average, in some cases
triple or higher.
Appendix Table 5
Poverty in the North Caucasus: percentage of the population with incomes
below the subsistence minimum (of the regional population)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Russia 22.4 24.7 22.1 20.8 29.9 29.1 27.6
Adigeya 46.3 46.4 56.7 42.0 45.1 54.8 28.0
Chechnya
Daghestan 71.2 64.7 53.8 60.6 63.2 46.4
Ingushetia 79.0 95.1 72.1
Kabardino-Balkaria 36.7 42.5 40.7 40.5 46.3 46.6 34.0
Karachai-Cherkassia 28.3 45.7 55.3 40.3 55.1 64.6 42.8
Krasnodar krai 23.7 32.4 25.1 25.0 26.5 35.3 24.5
North Ossetia 33.1 42.8 38.5 34.2 36.2 31.2 30.1
Stavropol krai 36.5 39.6 30.3 34.8 37.9 45.2 35.5
Source: Kosikov and Kosikova (1999); Goskomstat (Handbook, 2000 and 2002); Goskomstat 2001.
Government expenditures
As with all other statistics in the region, opinion varies as to what they actually mean.
UNDP’s NHDR for Armenia (1999), for example, shows a much lower percentage of
GDP spent on health care than the official government statistic and notes that between
87 per cent and 89 per cent of that amount is private expenditure. The UNDP’s
NHDR(1999) for Georgia  examines actual spending on health care and education and
finds that less than 65 per cent of budgeted funds were actually disbursed, of which up to
85 per cent failed to reach its intended destination in schools and up to 30 per cent was
lost en route to hospitals and clinics (UNDP’s NHDR for Georgia: 41-55). All countries
in the region share the compounded problem of sharp declines in GDP and sharp declines
in government expenditures as a share of GDP, reflected in (with the possible exception
of Russia), sharp declines in the share of GDP spent on health care and education.28
Appendix Table 6
General government expenditures and spending on education and health as a percentage of GDP
General
expenditure 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Russian av. n.a. n.a. 58.4 43.6 45.1 39.1 42.4 44.4 41.4 38.4 35.8
Armenia n.a. 28.0 46.7 82.9 44.1 28.8 24.4 21.1 22.2 25.5 21.6
Azerbaijan n.a. 40.7 48.4 55.9 45.9 22.5 20.3 20.8 21.2 23.7 20.8
Georgia n.a. 33.0 35.7 35.9 23.5 12.3 21.1 21.0 19.1 22.1 17.9
Health 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Russian av. n.a. 2.8 2.7 3.6 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.4 3.7 3.0 3.0
Armenia 2.4 3.2 4.4 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 n.a. n.a.
Azerbaijan 2.3 3.0 2.2 5.1 2.3 1.2 2.3 1.9 2.2 1.9 n.a.
Georgia 3.1 3.5 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.4
Education 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Russian av. 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.3 4.5 3.5 n.a. n.a. 3.6 3.2 n.a.
Armenia n.a. 7.5 8.9 5.2 2.5 3.3 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.9 n.a.
Azerbaijan n.a. 6.9 6.7 7.6 4.9 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.6 4.2 n.a.
Georgia 6.1 6.4 4.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.3 2.2 1.9 n.a.
Source: TransMONEE database (2002).
a UNDP’s NHDR (1999: iv) for Armenia; b UNDP (2001: 159).
Appendix Table 7
Social indicators: maternal/infant/under 5 mortality; birth rate and average male/female life expectancy
at birth, percentage of children in population
Russian average Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
1990
Life expectancy: Male 63.8 68.4 67.0 68.7
Female 74.3 75.2 74.8 76.1
Birth rate 13.4 22.5 25.5 17.1
Mortality: Maternal 47.4 40.1 9.3 20.5
Infant 17.4 18.5 23.0 15.8
under 5 22.3 23.8 40.5 19.9
1998
Life expectancy:  Male 61.3 70.8 67.9 82.0
Female 72.9 78.1 75.0 74.2
Birth rate 8.8 10.4 15.7 8.7
Mortality: Maternal 44.0 25.4 41.1 44.8
Infant 16.5 14.7 16.6 15.2
under 5 20.4 18.4 33.2 17.5
2000
Life expectancy: Male 59.0 70.5 68.6 73.0
Female 72.2 74.5 75.1 78.1
Birth rate 8.7 9.0 14.5 8.0
Mortality: Maternal 39.7 52.5 37.6 56.9
Infant 15.3 15.6 12.8 14.9
under 5 19.2 19.2 25.8 16.6
Source: TransMONEE database (2002).
Note: Maternal mortality per 100,000 births, infant and under 5 mortality and crude birth rate per 1,000
and life expectancy at birth.29
Russian regions
2000









Krasnodar krai 66.8 13.0
North Ossetia 68.5 11.3
Stavropol krai 67.8 14.5
Source:  Goskomstat (Handbook 2002).
Note: Life expectancy at birth not gender disaggregated in this source.
Appendix Table 8
Housing amenities
Running water Central heating Hot water supply Gas
Russian average 72.0 69.6 57.0 69.4




Source: Russian State Committee for Statistics (1992-2000).
Migration: Conflict related or economic migration?
As an indication of the difficulty in establishing the accuracy of population and
migration figures, the Armenia NHDR 1999 gives the population as 3,798,239 on
page  10, and on page 28 as 3,820,000 according to official data, but according to
numerous surveys as really only 3,100,000. The NHDR 1999 suggests that Armenia has
lost 18 per cent of its population between 1988 and 1998. Zubov suggests that the
number is closer to 40 per cent in Armenia and roughly 30 per cent in Azerbaijan and
Georgia (Zubov 2000:  36). Other sources suggest net population losses in Azerbaijan
and Georgia on the order of 25 per cent. Azerbaijan claims population growth of
900,000 between 1989 and 1999, although it registered a sharp decline in the birth rate
to close to the level of simple reproduction, very high infant and under 5 mortality rates,
and a total inflow of only 300,000 refugees. Georgia claims an absolutely stable
population over the decade. Part of the difficulty is caused by the lack of data on
emigration and the very significant number of citizens who are non-resident, but who
may occasionally, or eventually return. Much of the uncertainty is due to poor data
collection, chaotic conditions, etc. All numbers should be regarded as indications.30
Appendix Table 9a
Population
1991 1999 2000 2001
Armenia 3,600,000 3,100,000 +/- 3,344,336 3,336,190
Azerbaijan 7,200,000 7,949,300 7,748,163 7,771,092
Georgia 5,400,000 5,400,000 5,019,538 4,989,285
Russian republics
Adigeya    437,000  447,900 444,900
Chechen/Ingush  1,307,000 624,600
Daghestan  1,854,000 2,142,700 2,179,500
Ingushetia  314,900 466,300
Kabardino-Balkaria   777,000  785,500 782,000
Karachaevo-Cherkessia   427,000  431,300 428,600
Krasnodar krai  4,738,000 5,067,000 4,987,600
North Ossetia   643,000  670,100 678,200
Stavropol krai  2,499,000 2,659,800 2,642,600
Source: Data for Russian republics from Russian State Committee for Statistics (1992, 2000); for Armenia
and Azerbaijan from UNDP’s NHDR (1999, 2000, 2001), and TransMONEE database (2000).
Appendix Table 9b
Migration (in thousands)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Armenia 17.4 40.8  23.0 -6.3 -20.9 -19.1  -7.8 -6.4 -8.5 -8.2 -6.9 -11.2
Azerbaijan  2.1 70.5 -40.1 -14.2 -12.2 -11.0 -9.8 -7.4 -8.2 -5.1 -4.3 -5.6
Georgia -14.1 -39.0 -44.0 -41.6 -30.3 -31.5 -20.2 -11.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -1.3
Russia 115.3 183.8 16.7 252.9 440.3 809.6 502.4 343.5 349.0 278.6 129.2 189.8
Source: TransMONEE database (2002).
Russia received from 1998 1999
Armenia      14.4      12.4
Azerbaijan      18.3      12.1




Daghestan +288  +290
Ingushetia +517  -35
Kabardino-Balkaria -1,291 -1,695
Karachaevo-Cherkessia -573  1,986
Krasnodar krai +21,219 +28,582
North Ossetia +1,523 +1,931
Stavropol krai +15,741 +12,060
Source: Goskomstat (2000).CAUCASUS REGION
MSU Department of Geography 2001
Conflict Zones
Black Sea Black Sea

























































11 Adzharia (Georgia)Black Sea Black Sea




































































Brown coal Brown coal
Pumice Pumice
Cookery salt Cookery salt
Tungsten ore Tungsten ore
Molybdenum ore Molybdenum ore
Iron ore Iron ore
Aluminium ore Aluminium ore
Manganese ore Manganese ore
Barytes Barytes
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1  1 Adigeya Republic Adigeya Republic
2  2 Karachayevo Karachayevo- -Cherkessia Republic Cherkessia Republic
3  3 Kabardino Kabardino- -Balkarian Republic Balkarian Republic
4  4 North North- -Ossetian Republic Ossetian Republic
5  5 Ingush Republic Ingush Republic
6  6 Chechen Republic Chechen Republic
7  7 Dagestan Republic Dagestan Republic
8  8 Nagorno Nagorno- -Karabakh  Karabakh ( (disputed disputed) )
9  9 Nakhichivan  Nakhichivan ( (Azerbaijan Azerbaijan) )
10  10 Abkhazia  Abkhazia ( (Georgia Georgia) )
11  11 Adzharia  Adzharia ( (Georgia Georgia) )
Aqtau Aqtau
l
Oil Pipeline Oil Pipeline
Gas Pipeline Gas Pipeline
Tanker Terminal Tanker Terminal
Oil Oil
Gas Gas
Main Pipelines & TerminalsMain Railroads & Roads
RailRoads RailRoads
Roads Roads
1  1 Adigeya Republic Adigeya Republic
2  2 Karachayevo Karachayevo- -Cherkessia Republic Cherkessia Republic
3  3 Kabardino Kabardino- -Balkarian Republic Balkarian Republic
4  4 North North- -Ossetian Republic Ossetian Republic
5  5 Ingush Republic Ingush Republic
6  6 Chechen Republic Chechen Republic
7  7 Dagestan Republic Dagestan Republic
8  8 Nagorno Nagorno- -Karabakh  Karabakh ( (disputed disputed) )
9  9 Nakhichivan  Nakhichivan ( (Azerbaijan Azerbaijan) )
10  10 Abkhazia  Abkhazia ( (Georgia Georgia) )
11  11 Adzharia  Adzharia ( (Georgia Georgia) )
Black Sea Black Sea








































Van Van Khvoy Khvoy Ardabil Ardabil
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Abkhazians Abkhazians& &Armenians Armenians
Adighes Adighes
Adighes Adighes& &Abkhazians Abkhazians
Adighes Adighes& &Georgians Georgians
Aguls Aguls
Armenians Armenians
Armenians Armenians& &Azerbaijanese Azerbaijanese
Assyrians Assyrians
Avars Avars









Georgians Georgians& &Abkhazians Abkhazians
Georgians Georgians& &Armenians Armenians
Georgians Georgians& &Avars Avars
Georgians Georgians& &Basbiyens Basbiyens

















Russians Russians& &Adighes Adighes
Russians Russians& &Armenians Armenians
Russians Russians& &Azerbaijanese Azerbaijanese
Russians Russians& &Chechens Chechens
Russians Russians& &Nogais Nogais
Russians Russians& &Osetians Osetians











Ukrainians UkrainiansThe Caucasian Family of Languages
Kartavelian Group of Languages
Georgians
























Indo-European Family of Languages
Slavic Group of Languages
Russians
Ukrainians
Armenian Group of Languages
Armenians






Greek Group of Languages
Greeks
German Group of Languages
Germans
Romance Group of Languages
Moldavians
Altai Family of Languages








Mongolian Group of Languages
Kalmyks
Semite-Hamite Family of Languages
Assyrians
Ural Family of Languages
Finnish Group of Languages
Estonians
The Caucasus: Families of languages